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I. Introduction
The 1991 Civil Rights Act dramatically changed the recovery system for
victims of sex discrimination in the workplace.' Specifically, § 198 1a2 of the
amendments granted a statutory right of compensatory and punitive damages
to employees who are victims of intentional sex discrimination.3 This right
to compensatory and punitive damages represents a significant departure from
the remedies previously available under Title VII, which limited recovery to
remedies such as back-pay and an injunction for reinstatement.4
Although § 1981 a incorporates legal remedies into intentional sex dis-
crimination suits, Congress imposed caps on the amount of damages available
in these suits.' These caps have created a federal remedy for intentional sex
discrimination that lies between a fully compensatory remedy under tort law
and the limited remedies that existed under Title VII prior to § 1981 a's enact-
ment.6 Partly for this reason, courts are divided over whether a plaintiff can
recover punitive damages without proving compensatory damages under
§ 198 la.7 Traditionally, common law has dictated that a plaintiff cannot
recover punitive damages without compensatory damages.' Moreover, in light
of due process concerns, punitive damages are becoming more controversial.'
1. See Avon L. SergeantAre the LegaiRemediesAvailable to SexuallyHarassed Women
Adequate?, 20 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 185,187-88 (1999) (describing expansion of remedies in
Title VII suits after adoption of 1991 amendments). In addition to making punitive and compen-
satory damages available to victims of Title VII sex discrimination, the 1991 amendments also
provided a jury trial to these victims. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994) (granting right
to jury trial to plaintiffs seeking compensatory or punitive damages under § 1981 a).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(1994).
3. See id. § 1981a(aXI) (1994) (permitting recovery of compensatory and punitive
damages by individuals who could not otherwise recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
4. See Sergeant, supra note 1, at 187-88 (describing remedies available under 1964 Civil
Rights Act); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994) (permitting injunctions for relief such as
back-pay and reinstatement).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3) (1994) (establishing limitations on amount of total
compensatory and punitive damages recoverable in Title VII suits). Section 1981a's caps on
damages are based on the employer's size. Id. For example, a plaintiff may recover only
$50,000 total damages from an employer "who has no more than 14 and fewer than 101 em-
ployees," but a plaintiff may recover up to $300,000 total damages from an employer "who has
more than 500 employees." Id.
6. See Sergeant, supra note 1, at 188 (describing how caps on total damages under
§ 1981 a "bear no rational relationship to the wrong done and the harm suffered"). Sergeant
noted the advantage that § 1981a grants to victims of sex discrimination but also argued that the
damages caps often make the remedies available to these victims inadequate. Id.
7. See infra Part V (discussing court decisions that address whether punitive damages
may stand in absence of compensatory damage award).
8. See infra Part VI (discussing common law limitations on punitive damages).
9. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF R.EwDIES § 3.11(1), at 452 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing
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However, as a statutory remedy, the damages provision under § 1981a con-
tains certain restrictions that may eliminate the need to apply these common
law and due process limitations to punitive damages under § 198 Ia. ° Further-
more, the Supreme Court has articulated a standard for awarding punitive
damages under § 1981a that must enter into this mix." These facts, along
with the high number of employment discrimination cases facing courts today,
indicate a likelihood of further division among the circuit courts over whether
punitive damages may stand without compensatory damages under § 198 Ia. 2
It has been argued that a plaintiff should be entitled to recover punitive
damages without compensatory damages under the analogy that a plaintiff
suing under § 1983's for a civil rights deprivation normally may recover puni-
tive damages without compensatory damages. 4 Both statutes address civil
controversial nature of punitive damages); infra Part VII (discussing Supreme Court's due
process concerns in BMWofNorth America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)).
10. See infra Part VII (discussing common law and due process limitations as applied
to § 1981a claims).
11. See infra Part IX (discussing Court's standard for punitive damages under § 1981a
in Kolstad v. American DentalAss'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)).
12. See W. Muzette Hill, Employment Practices Liability: An Introduction to the Legal
Landscape, 629 PLI/LT 273,277 (2000) (noting that more than 40,000 employment discrimi-
nation cases are litigated each year). Hill notes that the number of employment discrimination
cases argued in federal courts are increasing "at a minimum of 17% per year, which is the fastest
growing category of federal litigation." Id; see Punitive Damages under Civil Rights Act of
1991, 13 FED. LmOATOR 147, 147 (1998) (noting unsettled law regarding issue of punitive
damages without compensatory damages under § 198 Ia).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
14. See Kelly Koenig Levi, Allowing a Title VII Punitive Damage Award Without an
Accompanying Compensatory or NominalAward: Further Unijng the Federal Civil Rights
Laws, 89 KY. L.J. 581, 614-15 (2001) (arguing that punitive damages should be permissible
under § 1981 a without compensatory damages because courts accord such treatment to § 1983
cases). Levi also argues that courts should recognize the availability of punitive damages
without compensatory damages under § 1981a under the analogy that this practice is accepted
under § 1981, Title VII's racial discrimination counterpart. Id. However, the law regarding the
availability of punitive damages without compensatory damages under § 1981 is unsettled. Id.
at 589. Moreover, Levi bases her premise on the assumption that the law regarding damages
under § 1981 follows the law regarding damages under § 1983. See id. (noting that presump-
tion of availability of punitive damages without compensatory damages is based on Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), which is § 1983 case). Although this Note does not address
whether punitive damages may stand without compensatory damages under § 1981 and there-
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rights violations; however, significant differences between § 198 la and § 1983
make the analogy inapplicable." As such, the argument for punitive damages
without compensatory damages under § 198 la'6 stands independent ofa § 1983
analysis." This argument can be made through an examination of common
restrictions on punitive damages and their application to § 198 1a as well as
through an analysis of Kolstad v. American Dental Ass 'n," in which the Su-
preme Court outlined the standard for awarding punitive damages under
§ 1981a."9
This Note argues that a plaintiff may recover punitive damages without
compensatory damages under §1981a. First, this Note briefly examines fed-
fore whether an analogy between § 1981 and § 1981a is appropriate, this Note argues that the
foundation for allowing punitive damages without compensatory damages under § 1983 does not
apply to § 1981a. See infra Part IV (discussing inapplicability of§ 1983 rationale to § 1981a).
15. See infra Part IV (discussing inapplicability of § 1983 rationale for awarding punitive
damages in absence of compensatory damages to § 1981a).
16. See infra Part VIII (discussing common restrictions on punitive damages and their
inapplicability to § 1981a).
17. See infra Parts VIII and IX (analyzing whether punitive damages may stand without
compensatory damages under § 1981 a).
18. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
19. See also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526,538 (1999) (establishing standard
for awarding punitive damages in Title VII actions to be mental state of employer rather than
employer's behavior). Kolstad sued her employer on grounds that the employer's Executive
Director discriminated against Kolstad in a hiring decision. Id. at 530-31. Kolstad claimed that
despite her excellent employment record, she had been a victim of a "preselection procedure
[that] suggested an intent by the Association to discriminate on the basis of sex." Id. at 531
(internal quotation marks omitted). KolMtad sought punitive damages against the American
Dental Association under § 1981 a of Title VII. Id. at 532. The District Court, however, refused
her request for a jury instruction on punitive damages. Id. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reversed, reasoning that the court should have permitted the jury to
consider punitive damages if "the jury could reasonably have found intentional discrimination."
Id. at 532 (citing Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 108 F.3d 1431, 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). On rehearing en banc, however, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the
district court, stating that "the evidence of the defendant's culpability must exceed what is
needed to show intentional discrimination." Id. at 533 (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n,
139 F.3d 958, 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The en banc panel
interpreted § 1981a to require a showing of "egregious misconduct" on the part of a defendant
to enable a jury to consider punitive damages. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit's decision, interpreting the standard for
awarding punitive damages under § 1981a to be based on the employer's state of mind, rather
than on the employer's conduct. Id. at 538. Specifically, the Court stated that to be liable for
punitive damages, the employer must "at least discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that
its actions will violate federal law." Id. at 536. Furthermore, the Court maintained that while
egregious misconduct may evidence the employer's state of mind, egregious misconduct need
not be present for a jury to consider and award punitive damages. Id. at 538; see infra note 204
and accompanying text (describing Court's articulation of § 1981a's standard for imposing
punitive damages); see also Part IX (discussing Koistad standard of punitive liability).
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eral remedies historically available for employment discrimination.20 An
examination of § 1981a and its legislative history will follow to determine
Congressional intent in the enactment of § 198 la.2 After briefly discussing
the court decisions that address this issue, this Note examines the limitations
that courts often place on punitive damages and argues that they have no
applicability to § 198 1a claims.22 Finally, this Note analyzes the requirements
for punitive liability under § 1981a that the Court established in Kolstad2 to
shed light on whether the requirements for punitive liability would permit
punitive damages absent compensatory damages.24 In conclusion, this Note
recommends that punitive damages should be permissible in the absence of
compensatory damages under § 198 la.2"
II. Remedies for Employment Discrimination Prior to 1991
Prior to 1964, victims of employment discrimination in the private sector
had limited federal recourse to remedy the wrongs that private discrimination
caused.26 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 expanded the recourse available to
these victims by establishing liability for employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin and by providing equitable
and injunctive remedies.27 This legislation marked a tremendous advance in
20. See infra Part 11 (detailing remedies historically available under Title VD).
21. See infra Part (analyzing statutory language and legislative history of§ 1981a).
22. See infra Parts VI, VI1, and VII (analyzing remedial scheme of § 1981a in light of
restrictions on punitive damages).
23. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
24. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 538 (1999) (establishing standard
for awarding punitive damages in Title VII actions to be mental state of employer rather than
employer's behavior); see infra Part IX (discussing Kolstad standard for punitive liability).
25. See infra Part X (concluding that plaintiffs may recover punitive damages without
compensatory damages).
26. See generally Hurd v. Hedge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (requiring "governmental action"
for Civil Rights Act of 1866 to take effect); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (finding that
Reconstruction-era legislation did not bar private discrimination). Congress enacted the Re-
construction-era legislation, including the Civil Rights Act of 1866, under the authority of the
Thirteenth Amendment See Michael Reiss, Requiem for an "Independent Remedy': The Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 as Remediesfor Employment Discrimination, 50 S.C. L. REV.
961, 971 (1977) (describing history of Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation). In the Civil
Rights Cases, the Court stated that the Thirteenth Amendment granted Congress the authority
only to enact legislation that would eliminate "all badges and incidents of slavery." Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 20. The Court did not find private individual's racial discrimination to
constitute a badge or incident of slavery, thus, the Court decided that the Reconstruction-era
legislation did not apply to private discrimination. See id. at 24 (describing Court's rationale).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (prohibiting employers, employment agencies, or
labor organizations to discriminate because of "race, color, religion, sex or national origin"); id.
§ 2000e-5(g) (outlining equitable remedies).
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the area of civil rights, yet facilitating mediation between employers and
employees remained a primary policy objective of Congress.' This policy
objective, along with the goal of making victims of employment discrimina-
tion "whole," fueled the enactment of Title VII 9 Congress, therefore, limited
the recourse available to victims to remedies such as back-pay, injunctions,
and reinstatement.3" While this remedy scheme helped victims who had suf-
fered discrimination in the form of lost wages or lost career opportunities,
many victims of discrimination still had no recourse for the injustices they
suffered."
The Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. AlfredH. Mayer Co.32 signaled
the beginning of expanded remedies for race-based employment discrimina-
tion.33 Jones addressed private acts of racial discrimination in the context of
28. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (1[), at 73 (1991) (Hyde ct al., dissenting report), reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 694; 758-59 (articulating congressional objectives in enacting prior
employment discrimination legislation). Congress recognized that "[Ijabor and employment
disputes involve individuals and companies with an ongoing relationship that began before
dissention and should continue after the differences are resolved." Id. at 72-73.
29. See id. at 72 (describing congressional goals in all prior employment discrimination
legislation). Representative Hyde's dissenting report to House Report No. 102-40 states the
following:
All of the labor and employment laws that Conigress has enacted have one thing in
common - they provide for "make-whole" relief designed to restore the injured
person to the status he or she would have enjoyed if the unlawful act had not taken
place .... By offering make-whole remedies, Congress has provided for full relief
while preserving working relationships which otherwise might be destroyed by a
punitive award.
Id. at 72-73.
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994) (listing as remedies, "[i]njunctions; appropriate
affirmative action; equitable relief; accrual of back pay, reduction of back pay, [or] limitations
on judicial orders").
31. See Sergeant, supra note 1, at 187 (recognizing that "[i]f a claimant did not lose her
job, there was little chance of monetary relief" under remedies of Title VHI).
32. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
33. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417-37 (1968) (establishing that
§ 1982 of Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits all racial discrimination in purchasing and selling
of property). The plaintiff in Jones brought suit in federal court because defendants refused to
sell a home to plaintiffs solely because of plaintiffs' race. Id. at 412. The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals concluded that § 1982 applied only to state actors and could not be utilized
to regulate private behavior. Id. In reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the Court maintained that
Congress has the authority under the Thirteenth Amendment to determine what constitutes the
"badges and incidents of slavery." Id. at 440. Congress, therefore, could determine that
abridging a person's fundamental right "to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property"
on the basis of the person's race constituted a badge or incident of slavery. Id. at 441 (quoting
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883)). The Court also noted that § 1982 applied only to
private acts of racial discrimination and that, unlike the Fair Housing Act of 1968, § 1982 could
not be applied to acts of discrimination based on national origin or religion. Id. at 413.
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housing discrimination under § 1982 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.' Prior to
Jones, the Supreme Court consistently interpreted the Reconstruction-era
statutes very narrowly." The Court maintained that this legislation worked
only to prevent actual slavery and did not apply to racial discrimination on the
part of private individuals and entities.' In determining that a private entity
could not refuse accessibility to housing on the basis of race, the Jones Court
expanded the scope of the Reconstruction-era statutes to prohibit private race-
based discrimination. 7
The idea of stemming private discrimination through the Reconstruction-
era statutes eventually translated into a prohibition against employment dis-
crimination in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.3" The Railway
Express Court concluded that § 1981 prohibited racial discrimination in the
making and enforcing of contracts.39 The Court found that the statute applied
not only to race-based discrimination in the formation of contracts, but also
applied to race-based discrimination in the ongoing performance of contracts,
including at-will employment.40 Railway Express also established the first
federal legal remedies for employment discrimination on the basis of race."1
Despite this expansion of remedies for race-based employment discrimination,
34. See id. at 440-41 (determining Congress could legislate to regulate private discrimina-
tion under authority of Thirteenth Amendment).
35. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing history of Supreme Court's
interpretation of Reconstruction-ca civil rights legislation).
36. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court's interpretation
of legislative purpose behind Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation).
37. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 438-39 (establishing authority of Congress to enact legislation
under Thirteenth Amendment that regulates conduct of private individuals).
38. See Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975) (applying
decision reached in Jones to context of § 1981 provision for "making and enforcing contracts"
in employment ). Petitioner brought suit under Title VII and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. Id. at 455-56. He claimed that he was a victim of discrimination on the basis of race and
that his employer had denied him promotion and seniority opportunities. Id. at 455. The statute
of limitations had expired on his Title VII claim. Id. at 456. However, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether the statute of limitations also had expired on his § 1981
claim. Id. at 457. The Court determined that petitioner's § 1981 claim stood independent of
his Title VII claim. Id. at 460-62. Although the Court distinguished § 1981 as a separate claim
from a Title VII claim and determined that a complainant could recover under both, the Court
determined that the statute of limitations for the § 1981 claim had expired. Id. at 460-67.
39. Id. at 459.
40. See id. (noting that Title VII's legislative history refers to § 1981 as another federal
statute from which employees may seek relief). The Court stated that "§ 1981 affords a federal
remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race." Id. at 459-60.
41. See id. at 460 (stating that "[an individual who establishes a cause of action under
§ 1981 is entitled to.. . legal relief, including compensatory and, under certain circumstances,
punitive damages").
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victims of sex discrimination could still only recover back-pay or injunctive
remedies.
42
III The 1991 Civil Rights Act
Looking to broaden the remedies available to victims of sex discrimina-
tion, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991.43 Congress recognized
that the facts of certain cases of sex discrimination warranted a broader
remedial scheme to make the plaintiff whole for her injury.44 Documented
cases demonstrated how victims of sex discrimination, particularly in the
context of sexual harassment, could not recover under the existing remedial
scheme despite substantial injury.45 In addition to physical, emotional, or
psychological harm, victims often suffered economic injury in rectifying the
effects of discrimination.' Furthermore, victims would experience feelings
of shame or emotional harm, for which the equitable remedies available under
the 1964 regime would not compensate. 4 1 Moreover, victims of racial dis-
crimination historically could recover compensation for a variety of injuries
suffered as result of the discrimination - not merely back-pay and reinstate-
ment.4" Noting this disparity, Congress recognized that in order to fully
42. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (I), at 24 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 694,
717-18 (describing rationale for expanding remedial scheme for sex discrimination in workplace
in Civil Rights Act of 1991). Representative Hyde's dissenting report to the House Report
notes that "[tlhe argument for the... expansion of title VII [to victims of sex discrimination]
is based on the fact that 42 U.S.C. [§1 1981 includes punitive and compensatory damages as
remedies." H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (1), at 69 (1991) (Hyde et al., dissenting report).
43. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (1), at 18(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. 549,556
(explaining purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1991 was in part "to strengthen existing remedies to
provide more effective deterrence and ensure compensation commensurate with the harms
suffered by victims of discrimination"); id. at 65 (recognizing need for damages to "make
discrimination victims whole for the terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and emo-
tional health, and to their self-respect and dignity").
44. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (I), at 73 (1991) (Hyde et al., dissenting report), re-
printed in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 759 (noting "weakness in Title VII, in that victims of on-
the-job discrimination, who are not fired or otherwise lose their jobs receive no monetary
remedy").
45. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (11), at 25-28 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,
718-22 (chronicling stories of sex discrimination victims who had inadequate remedies under
pre-1991 Title VII to compensate for injuries).
46. See id. at 25 (recognizing that "[v]ictims of discrimination often suffer substantial out-
of-pocket expenses as a result of the discrimination, none of which is compensable with equita-
ble remedies").
47. See id. at 25-28 (discussing emotional harm that victims of sex discrimination often
suffer).
48. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (1), at 65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 549,603
(noting broader availability of damages under § 1981).
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compensate victims of sex discrimination in the workplace, it would have to
provide an expanded remedial structure to these victims.49
Compensation was not Congress's only goal in enacting a broader
remedial scheme for sex discrimination in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.50
Congress also was concerned that the remedies then available under Title VII
ineffectively deterred sex discrimination in the workplace.5" Without an
effective deterrent, incidences of sex discrimination fail to abate, and employ-
ers would have no incentive to establish preventative programs or remedial
outlets for sex discrimination. 2
Congress recognized that by expanding damages available to compensate
victims, employers would face a bigger potential cost of engaging in or per-
mitting sex discrimination. 3 Nonetheless, Congress did not stop by creating
a remedial structure consisting of only compensatory damages.54 Congress's
express desire to create greater deterrence from discrimination indicates the
importance of the punitive damages provision.5
IV The Inapplicability of the § 1983 Analogy
A proposition has surfaced recently, which states that because courts
permit punitive damages without compensatory damages in § 1983 actions,
courts should similarly have the freedom to award punitive damages without
compensatory damages under § 198 la. 6 However, substantive and structural
49. See id. at 104 (articulating principle behind 1991 civil rights legislation: "damages
provision was drafted based on the principle that the scope of the harm should define the scope
of the remedy").
50. See id. at 66, 69 (listing "compensation" and "deterrence" as reasons for expanding
remedies for employment discrimination).
51. See id. at 68 (stating that equitable remedies alone "leaves prevailing plaintiffs with-
out remedies for their injuries and allows employers who discriminate to avoid any meaningful
liability").
52. See id. at 69 (explaining that increased risk of costs for engaging in discrimination
will provide effective deterrence). Congress reasoned that "[m]aking employer liable for all
losses - economic and otherwise -which are incurred as a consequence of prohibited discrimi-
nation... will serve as a necessary deterrent to future acts of discrimination." Id.
53. See id. at 69 (explaining that higher costs associated with discrimination will help
deter such incidents).
54. See 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b) (1994) (providing punitive as well as compensatory damages,
subject to total damage caps); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978) (noting that "Con-
gress... did not address directly the question of damages" when drafting § 1983).
55. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (1), at73 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 594,611
(stating that "substantial awards may be both necessary and appropriate in some cases.., to
ensure that the employer is deterred from engaging in future acts of discrimination").
56. See Levi, supra note 14, at 611-12 (arguing for unification of remedy structure under
§ 1981a with that under § 1983); supra note 14 (discussing Levi's argument).
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differences between the statutes indicate that a blanket analogy would be
improper." Section 1983 creates a constitutional tort." Through § 1983,
Congress defined a legal interest, the deprivation of which creates grounds for
a plaintiff to seek damages.59 Moreover, Congress remained silent as to the
nature of damages as well as to the amount of damages recoverable.' ° These
factors illustrate how a § 1983 claim parallels common law trespass torts,61
which are claims based on direct violations of an individual's established right
or interest, regardless of whether harm actually results.62
Because § 1983 claims are of a trespass nafure, courts have determined
that the same rules regarding damages for these torts, in which a plaintiff
recovers for the invasion of a legally cognizable interest, should apply to
§ 1983.63 Among the commonly accepted rules relating to trespass torts is
the principle that a plaintiff's demonstration of an invasion - resulting in a
finding of liability - entitles the plaintiff to recover nominal damages.6 '
Furthermore, in severe cases of trespass torts, many courts recognize that
punitive damages may stand without compensatory damages.65  For that
reason, courts will automatically institute a nominal damages award for a
57. See infra notes 58-74 and accompanying text (detailing fundamental differences
between § 1981aand § 1983).
58. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 7.4(1), at 334 (defining Constitutional tort, as established
through § 1983, as claim "against those who deprive the plaintiff of some specific federal right
under 'color of state law'").
59. See Mark Morrell, Comment & Note, WhFo Wants Nominal Damages Anyway? The
Impact ofan Automatic Entitlement to NominalDamages Under§ 1983,13 REGENT U. L. REV.
225, 228 (2000) (noting that "the law recognizes the importance to organized society that [con-
stitutional] rights be scrupulously observed, even if insufficient proof exists for compensatory
or punitive damages" (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (remaining silent on issue of damages).
61. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 715
(1999) (noting that § 1983 claim "sounds in tort and is most analogous to the various actions
that lay at common law to recover damages for interference with property interests").
62. See infra Part VI.A (discussing evolution of trespass torts).
63. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (recognizing that "[c]ommon-law
courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of certain 'absolute' rights that are not shown
to have caused actual injury through the award of a nominal sum of money" and applying that
rationale to § 1983 claim).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 cmt. b (1977) (stating that "[n]ominal
damages can be awarded when the defendant has invaded an interest of the plaintiff... in
actions for trespass to the person, a breach of duty by a public officer, interference with a right
to vote or to hold public office and trespass to land").
65. See id. § 908 cmt. c (noting that "an award of nominal damages is enough to support
a further award of punitive damages, when a tort, such as a trespass to land, is committed for
an outrageous purpose, but no significant harm has resulted").
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finding of liability without a simultaneous finding of compensatory dam-
ages." Consequently, this nominal damages award will usually justify puni-
tive damages.67
Unlike § 1983, § 1981a does not parallel common law trespass claims."
First, § 198 1a is merely a statutory remedies scheme.69 Title VII encompasses
the underlying claim upon which a plaintiff may recover damages through
§ 198 1a, and Title VII has never been similar to common law trespass claim.7°
This fact is evident in the original recovery scheme for sex discrimination
under Title VII. Congress enacted Title VII originally to provide equitable
relief for wrongs committed by employers.7" Although Title VII prohibits sex
discrimination in the workplace, the fact that plaintiffs could only recover
very limited remedies suggests that Congress did not intend to create a legally
cognizable interest for which a plaintiff could recover the full gamut of
damages normally available in trespassory torts.72 The 1991 Civil Rights Act
did not change this nature of a Title VII claim.73 Congress has placed limits
on the amount of damages, both compensatory and punitive, which indicates
its reluctance to transform Title VII into a recognizable legal interest for
66. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 266-67 (granting nominal damages for § 1983 claim); Morrell,
supra note 59, at 232-37 (discussing Carey and courts' willingness to award nominal damages
for § 1983 violations both upon plaintiff's post-verdict request for nominal damages and upon
plaintiff's failure to request nominal damages).
67. See Levi, supra note 14, at 595 n.64, n.96, n.97 (citing numerous federal cases which
have granted punitive damages without compensatory damages for § 1983 claims).
68. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text (describing how Title VII - and
§ 1981a -deviate from common law trespass).
69. See 42 U.S.C. 1981a (1994) (outlining remedies available for violations of Title VII).
70. See C.I.R. v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 334 (1995) (noting that "[pre-1991 Title VI1]
was not tortlike because it addressed 'legal injuries of an economic character'") (citing United
States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 239 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although post-
1991 Title VII does permit compensatory and punitive damages, the caps that Congress has
implemented indicate that Title VII would still not be considered "tortlike" because a plaintiff
would be unable to recover fill damages if the injury for which she sought compensation were
to exceed the maximum liability amount under the caps. Cf. City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 715 (noting that common law claims, as well as § 1983
claims, entail plaintiff's entitlement to "just compensation" upon a finding of liability on part
of defendant); DOBBS, supra note 9, § 7.4(3), at 342 (noting that "courts have held that the
defendant is liable for all the damages naturally resulting from a constitutional deprivation"
(emphasis added)).
.71. See Schleier, 515 U.S. at 334 (noting that pre-1991 Title VII only permitted equitable
remedies).
72. See id. (acknowledging that absence of legal remedies under Title VII indicated that
"Title VII was not tortlike"
73. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing how damages caps limit amount
of compensation that plaintiff may seek under § 1981a).
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which a plaintiff may recover unlimited damages based on her actual loss and
on the defendant's conduct."4
V Court Decisions Regarding Punitive Damages Under § 1981a
There is understandable disagreement among courts about whether they
can award punitive damages in the absence of compensatory damages in
§ 1981a suits." Often, courts require a compensatory damages award before
a jury may grant punitive damages. s The circuit courts are split, however, on
whether this rule applies to sex discrimination suits under § 198 la.77
The First Circuit Court of Appeals decided against upholding punitive
damages without compensatory damages in Kerr-Selgas v. American Air-
lines.7 The plaintiff in Kerr-Selgas sued her employer for discriminatory
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3) (1994) (providing damages caps for compensatory and
punitive damages combined); Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 715 (stating that common law tort
claims entitle plaintiff to recovery of "just compensation"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 901 cmt. a (1977) (stating that "the law of torts attempts primarily to put an injured person in
a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the tort").
75. See infra notes 78, 84, 89, and 92 and accompanying text (outlining cases disagreeing
on issue of punitive damages without compensatory damages). Compare Timm v. Progressive
Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998) (determining that punitive damages are
recoverable in absence of compensatory damages under § 1981a), Hennessy v. Penril Data-
comm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995) (same), and Cush-Crawford v. Adchem
Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294 (2d Cir. 2000) (same), with Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 69
F.3d 1205 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding punitive damages are not recoverable in absence ofcompen-
satory damages under § 1981a in Title VII suits).
76. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996) (stating that "[t]he
principle that exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages
has a long pedigree") (internal quotation marks omitted); Kerr-Selgas, 69 F.3d at 1214 (1st Cir.
1995) (stating "generally a claimant may not recover punitive damages without establishing
liability for either compensatory or nominal damages").
77. See infra notes 78-96 (detailing courts that are split on issue of punitive damages in
absence of compensatory damages).
78. See Kerr-Selgas v. Am. Airlines, 69 F.3d 1205, 1214-15 (1st Cir. 1995) (vacating
punitive damages award after trial court allotted zero compensatory damages to federal claim).
Kerr-Selgas, an employee of American Airlines, claimed that her immediate supervisor made
sexual advances to her in an attempt "to manipulate her into an 'amorous relationship.'" Id. at
1206-07. After she rejected these advances, he treated her unfairly in several work situations,
including disparaging her in the presence of others, invading her privacy by intrusive comments
and inquiries, and excluding her from job-related activities. Id. at 1207. American Airlines
finally terminated her, in part, because her supervisor filed negative evaluations of her perfor-
mance. Id. The jury awarded Kerr-Selgas $2,000,000 under her commonwealth sex discrimina-
tion claim and $350,000 under her federal claim. Id. at 1209. After remittitur to reduce the
compensatory award to $400,000, the trial judge allocated the entirety of compensatory damages
to the commonwealth claim and the entirety of the punitive damages to the federal claim. Id.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly allocated the damages
because of the answers the jury submitted on a special verdict form. Id. at 1214. The court
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termination.79 After the jury found for the plaintiff, the trial judge allotted all
of the punitive damages to the federal claim and all of the compensatory
damages to the state claim.80 On appeal, the circuit court vacated the punitive
damage award, stating that without a related compensatory award, the punitive
damages were untenable.81
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld punitive damages
despite an absence of compensatory damages in Hennessy v. Penril Data-
comm Networks, Inc.82 and in Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc. 3 The
plaintiff in Hennessey sued her employer for sex and pregnancy discrimina-
tion.8 4 The jury awarded the plaintiff back-pay, reinstatement, and although
the jury failed to award compensatory damages, the jury did award punitive
damages, which the trial court upheld.85 On appeal, the defendant raised the
issue of whether the plaintiff could recover punitive damages without compen-
satory damages, arguing that Illinois state law prevented such action.86 The
concluded that "the most plausible explanation consistent with the special verdicts" was the
jury's decision not to award compensatory damages under the Title VII claim. Id. Reasoning
that tort law prohibited such an award, the court then held that the award of punitive damages
could not stand without a compensatory damage award. Id. at 1214-15. Although the court did
suggest that a jury could award punitive damages with only a nominal damage award despite
the absence of language concerning nominal damages in § 1981 a, the court declined to grant
Kerr-Selgas a nominal damage award to sustain the punitive damages. Id. at 1215.
79. See id. at 1209 (detailing procedural history of case).
80. Id.
81. See id. at 1214-15 (noting historical inability to recover punitive damages without
award of compensatory or nominal damages) (citing Cooper Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d 262, 281-83 (3d Cir. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 908 cmt. c (1979)).
82. 69 F.3d 1344 (7th Cir. 1995).
83. 137 F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 1998).
84. See Hennesmy, 69 F.3d at 1348-49 (describing claim). Hennessey, a computer sales-
person with Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc. (Penril), claimed that a co-worker, Bums, harassed
her on two occasions prior to his becoming her supervisor. Id. at 1347-48. These encounters
entailed taking Hennessey (and other co-workers) to a striptease club, encouraging her to
perform a striptease, and making comparisons between her body and those of the dancers, as well
as verbally expressing his attraction to her on a later occasion. Id. Shortly after Hennessey
learned that she had become pregnant, Bums was promoted to become Hennessey's supervisor.
Id. at 1348. Upon discovering her pregnancy, Bums chilled to Hennessey, eventually placing
her on probation, writing unfavorable reviews of her performance, and ultimately terminating
her employment. Id. Hennessey filed suit under Title VII for sex and pregnancy discrimination.
Id. at 1348-49. The trial court found in favor of Henessey and awarded punitive damages of
$300,000 against Penril. Id. at 1349. On appeal, Penril argued that the punitive damages could
not stand without a finding of compensatory damages. Id. at 1351. The trial court, dismissing
the defendant's analogy to Illinois common law, asserted that the statutory language of § 1981a
permitted the punitive award to stand without compensatory damages. Id. at 1352.
85. Id. at 1349.
86. Id. at 1351.
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court ruled, however, that the availability of remedies under § 1981 a were not
subject to Illinois state law restrictions, as § 1981a is a federal statute .
Moreover, the court reasoned that the language of the statute did not prevent
the jury from awarding punitive damages without compensatory damages.""
The plaintiff in Timm sued her employer under a hostile-work-environ-
ment theory only under Title VII. 9 The jury found for the plaintiff, but only
awarded punitive damages." On appeal, the court rejected the First Circuit's
analysis, determining that the jury could have found that the plaintiff had
satisfied the criteria for awarding punitive damages without proving a need for
compensation.
91
Recently, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York sided
with the Seventh Circuit on this issue in Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp.'
87. Id. at 1352.
88. Id.
89. See Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1009 (detailing trial
court's conclusion that co-worker's behavior created hostile work environment) (citing Meritor
Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17
(1993)). Timm based her claim of discrimination against Progressive Steel on allegations that
a co-worker frequently harassed her through unwelcome sexual contact and advances. Id. at
1009. In addition to inappropriate comments, the co-worker "frequently snuck up from behind
her and grabbed or pinched her buttocks" or "would run his hand up her thighs." Id. At trial,
the jury awarded punitive damages but no compensatory damages. Id. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals maintained that the jury's award of punitive damages was "not inconsistent
with the lack of compensatory damages." Id. at 1010. The court reasoned that the fact that
Timm was a former prison-guard could have led the jury to reasonably believe that her injury
did not warrant compensation, despite the fact that the jury found Timm's co-worker's conduct
to warrant punitive damages. Id. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals hinted in Kerr-Selgas,
the court in Timm suggested that a trial court could award nominal damages in this situation,
but again the court refused to do so. Id.
90. See Timm, 137 F.3d at 1009 (detailing procedural history of case).
91. See id. at 1010-11 (arguing "nothing in the plain language of § 1981a conditions an
award of punitive damages on an underlying award of compensatory damages") (quoting
Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks omitted))).
92. See Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(determining that punitive damages are recoverable in absence of compensatory damages).
Cush-Crawford sued her employer on the basis of her supervisor's unwelcome sexual advances,
which created a hostile work environment. Id. at 296. Cush-Crawford complained to Adchem
about the unwelcome sexual advances to no avail. Id. The jury imputed the liability for the
supervisor's actions to the employer Adchem and awarded punitive damages but no compensa-
tory damages. Id. at 297. When Adchem moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on grounds that the jury granted punitive
damages in the absence of compensatory damages, the trial court ruled that compensatory
damages need not predicate punitive damages. Id. at 299. The court reasoned that a Title VII
claim is more similar to a § 1983 civil rights claim than a common-law tort claim; thus, the
rationale of the First Circuit in Kerr-Selgas was incorrect. Id. at 299. Furthermore, the trial
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The plaintiff in Cush-Crawford sued her employer under a hostile-work-
environment theory.9" The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and
awarded only punitive damages. 94 The trial court, in upholding the award,
reasoned that the punitive damage award did not require a comparable com-
pensatory damages award." The trial court also distinguished suits under
Title VII from common-law tort suits that require a jury to award compensa-
tory damages before a court may sustain a punitive damages award."
The Supreme Court's ruling in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass 'n may
help to clarify the issue of whether a court may uphold punitive damages
without compensatory damages under § 1981a."' The Court held that the
standard for awarding punitive damages centered on the employer's mental
state while engaging in discriminatory acts. 99 Although the offensive nature
of a defendant's behavior may indicate that the defendant discriminated with
malice or reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights, the Court emphasized
that egregious behavior on the part of the employer was neither definitive nor
necessary to satisfy the standard for proving punitive damages."ro Shifting the
standard to the employer's mental state and away from the employer's actual
court cited several Title VII cases which digressed from common-law principles. Id. Again,
the trial court in Cush-Crawford addressed the issue of nominal damages in Title VII suits,
suggesting that a court could award nominal damages in the absence of compensatory damages,
but chose not to do so. Id.
93. See id. at 296 (detailing procedural history of case).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 299 (explaining court's ruling).
96. See id. (distinguishing Title VII suits from common law tort suits). The court in
Cush-Crawford, noting that plaintiffs may recover punitive damages without compensatory
damages in civil rights suits under § 1983, determined that Title VII suits more closely resemble
§ 1983 than common law tort actions. Id. The court therefore found "no mason... for reading
a compensatoy-punitive link into ... Title VII." Id (quoting Timm v. Progressive Steel
Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1009 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
97. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
98. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 538 (1999) (establishing standard
for awarding punitive damages in Title VII actions to be mental state of employer rather than
employer's behavior). For a detailed discussion of Kolstad, see supra note 19.
99. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 538 (interpreting § 1981a(bXl) to require specific mental
state distinct from behavior on part of employer for employee to recover punitive damages).
100. See id. at 535 ("While egregious misconduct is evidence of the requisite mental
state ... [§ 1981 a] does not require a showing of egregious or outrageous discrimination inde-
pendent of the employer's state of mind."). The Kolstad Court also maintained that an employer
may be held vicariously liable for punitive damages when an employee engages in sex discrimi-
nation against another employee, even though the employer does not have the requisite mental
state, unless the employer exhibits "good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII." Id. at 545
(quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958,974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Tatel, J., dissenting)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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behavior, the Court opened the door to the possibility that an employer's
mental state may warrant a punitive damages award without the employer's
behavior being sufficiently outrageous to cause injury to the plaintiff.'
VI. Limitations on Punitive Damages
Courts usually grant punitive damages subject to certain informal restric-
tions relating to corresponding compensatory damages."0 2 The rationale for
this policy stems from the idea that in most cases the primary purpose of
awarding damages is to compensate a victim at the expense of the person who
wronged him.1" 3 Courts and commentators view punitive damages as "extra-
compensatory."" Punitive damages serve two primary objectives: to punish
101. See id. at 538 (stating that specific mental state does not mandate "that employers
must engage in conduct with some independent, 'egregious' quality before being subject to a
punitive award"); see also Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010-11
(7th Cir. 1998) (describing situations in which plaintiff may suffer injury sufficient to have
standing to bring claim, yet not have injury sufficient to warrant compensation). The court in
Timm analogized the situation at hand to housing discrimination cases involving "testers." Id.
at 1010. Testers never suffer injury requiring compensation because they never actually intend
to occupy the housing in question. Id. When testers suffer discrimination, however, they
automatically suffer injury in fact and may thus recover punitive damages. Id. at 1010-11. The
court argued that even a person reading a newspaper advertisement depicting "racially unbal-
anced groups of models may be entitled to punitive damages." Id. (citing Tyus v. Urban Search
Mgmt., 102 F.3d 256,266 (7th Cir. 1996)), Because of the Supreme Court's ruling in Kolstad,
a situation may arise in which an employee has an injury sufficient for standing, yet no injury
requiring compensation, and the employee may prove that the employer's mental state during
the discrimination fulfills the standard for assessing punitive damages. See Cush-Crawford v.
Adchem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299-300 (maintaining that language of § 1981a, as inter-
preted in Koistad, "indicates that a Title VII plaintiff seeking punitive damages need not show
'egregious' behavior by an employer, but merely demonstrate that the employer knew that it
may have been acting in violation of federal law").
102. See infra notes 109-30 and accompanying text (articulating "actual damages rule");
notes 131-40 and accompanying text (articulating "ratio rule").
103. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.1, at 279 (describing use of word "damages" to often
mean "either the harm or loss suffered by the plaintiff"); Janet Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive
Damages: Toward a PrincipledApproach, 31 HASTINGS L. J. 639,643 (1980) (stating criticism
of punitive damages is that they are extra-compensatory). Mallor and Roberts proposed that
punitive damages evolved as a way to compensate plaintiffs either for injury that could be
compensated, such as intangible injury, or for injury whose compensatory value was difficult
for courts to measure. Id. at 642-43. Either way, Mallor and Roberts suggested that punitive
damages developed in the law primarily to compensate. Id. at 643. They claimed that critics
of punitive damages argue that punitive damages have become obsolete with the expansion of
compensatory damages for intangible and otherwise immeasurable harms. Id. at 643. Mallor
and Roberts argued, however, that although punitive damages originated to compensate, their
commonly accepted purpose of punishment and deterrence presently serves important societal
goals. Id. at 647-50.
104. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.11(1), at 452 (noting punitive damages "go beyond any
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and to deter."03 Juries award these damages in addition to any compensatory
damages." Although punitive damages serve the important purpose of pun-
ishing socially offensive behavior, courts recognize that punitive damages are
subject to abuse."° Courts therefore have been reluctant to uphold punitive
damage awards under circumstances in which these informal restrictions are
not present 1 8
A. Actual Damages Requirement
Many courts will not award punitive damages unless the plaintiff proves
actual damage.'" This requirement stems from the common law principle that
a plaintiff cannot recover on a claim unless the plaintiff proved injury to a
legally recognized interest.1 If a plaintiff has suffered no deprivation of a
legally recognized right or interest, then the plaintiff has no standing to bring
a claim.1 1 The plaintiff would not, therefore, be entitled to recover punitive
damages.
112
The early common law recognized the two following types of claims:
trespass and trespass on the case. 3 Originally, courts only would recognize
obvious elements of ordinary compensation and are intended to punish or deter extreme
departures from acceptable conduct").
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979) (statingthat punitive damages
are "awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and
others like him from similar conduct in the future"; DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.11(1), at 453
(noting punishment and deterrence as primary purposes of punitive damages).
106. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.11(1), at 455 (explaining that punitive damages are
awarded separately from compensatory damages). Dobbs states that while "all remedies may
have punitive effects," juries award punitive damages separately from compensatory damages.
Id.
107. See id. § 3.11(1), at 452-55 (discussing controversial nature of punitive damages and
"basic rules" for granting punitive damages).
108. See id. § 3.11(10), at 512 (discussing court reluctance to uphold punitive damage
award in absence of actual damage); id. § 3.11(11), at 515 (discussing court reluctance to
uphold punitive damages that do not bear "some reasonable relationship to the amount of
compensatory damages awarded").
109. See id. § 3.11(10), at 515 (explaining "actual damages rule"); JANES M. FISCHER,
UNDERSTANDINO REMEDIES § 302, at 702 (1999) (same).
110. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, 528-29
(1957) [hereinafler Exemplary Damages] (stating principle that plaintiff must have cause of
action other than to punish defendant to sustain punitive damages). A plaintiff cannot "maintain
an action solely to punish the defendant for wrongful conduct." Id. at 529.
.111. See id. (articulating requirement that plaintiff must have standing to recover punitive
damages).
112. Id.
113. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 7, at 28-40 (4th ed. 1971)
(discussing evolution of writs of "trespass" and "trespass on the case").
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trespass claims." 4 A cause of action for trespass would involve an injury to
the plaintiff that resulted directly from the defendant's conduct."' As this
Note mentioned previously in its discussion of § 1983, a trespass claim
entailed a direct invasion of the plaintiffs person, property, or other legally
protected interest. 6 Moreover, a defendant would have to have acted
intentionally to be guilty of a trespass action."' Courts soon realized that
a plaintiff might suffer an injury that was not a direct invasion on the part
of the defendant; rather, the injury was only indirectly caused by a defen-
dant's conduct." Under the theory of trespass, such a plaintiff would be
unable to recover compensation for this injury." 9 For this reason, courts
developed the theory of trespass on the case.' For a plaintiff to recover
under trespass on the case, courts required that a plaintiff demonstrate not
only an invasion of a legal interest, but also that this invasion damaged the
114. See id. at 28 (noting that courts originally recognized only trespass cases).
115. See Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansel & Bonello, 477 A2d 1224,1228 (N.J. 1984)
(recognizing that trespass provided "remedy for forcible, direct, and immediate injuries to
persons or property"). The New Jersey Supreme Court in Nappe articulated the principle of
trespass distinctly, stating that trespass claims were "directed at breaches of the King's peace"
and involved harms that were a direct consequence-of a defendant's actions. Id.
116. See PROSSER, supra note 113, § 7, at 28 (noting that "[t]respass was the remedy for
all forcible, direct and immediate injuries, whether to person or to property"); see also supra
Part IV (describing similarities between § 1983 and trespass claims at common law).
117. See Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth Century America:
A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1723 (1981) (noting that "trespass" often entailed inten-
tional conduct). Schwartz explains that "the early writ of trespass ... seems to have been
primarily addressed to intentional harm-causing conduct, conduct that would now be identified
as basically criminal." Id.; see also Nappe, 477 A.2d at 1228 (noting that activity falling under
"trespass" was "quasi-criminal in nature"). But see id. at 1229 (maintaining that distinction
between "trespass" and "trespass on the case" "was not between intentional and negligent con-
duct, but was based instead on the causal sequence and the directness of the harm").
118. See PROssER, supra note 113, § 7, at 28-29 (noting subsequent development of cause
of action for indirect injury); see also Nappe, 477 A.2d at 1229 (same). The Nappe court
explained that "[t]respass on the case.., developed as a supplement to trespass to afford a
remedy for injury resulting indirectly." Id.
119. See Nappe, 477 A.2d at 1228 (recognizing that trespass claims only involved
"forcible, direct" harms).
120. See PROSSE, supra note 113, § 7, at 28-29 (describing development of "trespass on
the case"); see also Nappe, 447 A.2d at 1229 (same). The distinction between trespass and
trespass on the case is best clarified as follows:
The distinction in law is, where the immediate act itself occasions a prejudice, or
is an injury to the plaintiff's person, house, land, etc. and where the act itself is not
an injury, but a consequence from that act is prejudicial to the plaintiff's person,
house, land, etc. In the first case trespass... will lie; in the last it will not, but the
plaintiff's proper remedy is by an action on the case.
Reynolds v. Clarke, 92 Eng. Rep. 410,413 (1725).
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plaintiff. 21 Even if a plaintiff could prove that a defendant's conduct had
indirectly invaded a plaintiff's legal interest, the plaintiff would not have
standing to sue under trespass on the case unless the plaintiff also proved
damage requiring compensation.'
22
The development of trespass on the case led to the idea that a plaintiff
could not recover punitive damages without compensatory damages.
23
Proving injury was a required element of trespass on the case.124  For this
reason, if a plaintiff failed to prove a need for compensation, the claim itself
would fail." s The plaintiff would then have no right to recover punitive
damages.
126
Courts recognized that claims which evolved from trespass required no
demonstration of damage apart from an invasion of a legally protected inter-
est.2 These claims differed from claims which evolved from trespass on the
case in that a plaintiff would not need to prove damage to succeed in proving
the claim. To acknowledge a plaintiff's rights in this situation, courts
developed nominal damages 29 While many jurisdictions today have permit-
121. See Nappe, 477 A.2d at 1229 (recognizing that "[i]n trespass on the case there could
ordinarily be no liability unless actual damage was proven") (citing 2 W. WALT, ACTIONS AND
DEFENSES 99-02 (1877); PROSSER, supra note 113, § 7, at 28-30 (4th ed. 1971)).
122. See Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Anseil & Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224, 1229 (N.J. 1984)
(articulating requirement that plaintiff prove damage to recover under "trespass on the case").
123. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 110, at 528-29 (stating that plaintiffwho cannot
sustain cause of action cannot recover punitive damages); infra text accompanying notes 124-26
(discussing injury requirement for "trespass on the case").
124. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of "trespass on
the case").
125. See PROSSER, supra note 113, § 7, at 28-29 (describing that "trespass on the case"
required proof of damage beyond defendant's interference with plaintiff's legal interest).
126. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 110, at 528-29 (discussing plaintiff's need to
prove claim to recover punitive damages).
127. See PROSSER, supra note 113, § 7, at 29 (maintaining that plaintiff need not prove
actual damage in trespass claim to sustain cause of action); see also Nappe, 477 A.2d at 1228-
29 (same). The Nappe court noted that "[p]roof of actual damage was not required [in trespass
actions] because invasion of the plaintiff's rights was regarded as the tort in itself." Id.
128. See Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 477 A.2d 1224, 1228-29 (N.J.
1984) (distinguishing "trespass" from "trespass on the case").
129. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 907 (1979) (stating that nominal damages
exist for situations in which plaintiff proved cause of action, but either no harm exists or
plaintiff fails to prove harm); DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.3(2), at 295 (suggesting that nominal
damages are available "in tort cases that have their roots in the writ of trespass as distinct from
the action on the case"). Courts generally have recognized that intentional torts, such as
trespass, cause injury even if they do not cause damage. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.,
563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997) (stating that "law recognizes actual harm in every trespass
to land whether or not compensatory damages are awarded"). Only torts that have descended
from trespass may sustain nominal damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 907,
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ted punitive damages with only nominal damages, some courts still maintain
that a plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages, even on trespass claims,
without compensatory damages. 3°
B. Ratio Between Punitive and Compensatory Damages
Many jurisdictions also require that punitive damages bear a "reasonable
relationship" to the compensatory damages. 3' There are two primary ratio-
nales for this principle.'32 First, courts reason that because punitive damages
serve to punish, the amount of punitive damages a defendant must pay should
reflect the nature of the defendant's conduct. 33 If a defendant only causes
minimal damage, many courts argue that the defendant's conduct does not
warrant an excessive punishment. 34 In addition, the "reasonable relationship"
test prevents juries from granting excessive punitive damages. 35 In common
law claims, juries usually have tremendous discretion in determining the
amount of punitive damages a defendant should pay."~ Therefore, a jury's
cmt. b (1977) (listing examples of trespass torts that may sustain nominal damages). Because
the tort of negligence has evolved from trespass on the case, nominal damages are not available
in cases of negligence, as well as any other tort that indirectly causes injury. See id. § 907, cmt
a (stating that when actual damage is required to sustain cause of action, nominal damages will
not stand).
130. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 110, at 529 (explaining that while courts may
permit recovery of punitive damages with only nominal damages, some do not).
131. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.11 (11), at 516 (recognizing that many courts have
required that punitive damages "must be limited so that [they] bear some reasonable relationship
to the amount of compensatory damages").
132. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 110, at 530-31 (stating that judicial review of
punitive damages awards exists to check jury discretion and to conform defendant's punishment
with inflicted harm).
133. See id. (stating that many courts argue that "there must be a proper relationship
between the exemplary damages and the type of injury inflicted"). But see DOBBS, supra note
9, § 3.11(11), at 519 (advancing argument that ratio "rules" are inconsistent with purpose of
punitive damages "to be proportioned to the defendant's evil attitude and serious misconduct");
Exemplary Damages, supra note I 10, at 530-31 (arguing that associating punitive damages with
actual harm undermines purpose of punitive damages to punish "social undesirability of the
defendant's behavior").
134. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 158 (Wis. 1997) (presenting
argument that plaintiff with nominal interest should not recover punitive damages because
society "has little interest" in rectifying insignificant harms). Some states have enacted "tort-
reform" statutes to limit the jury's discretion in granting punitive damages in tort law. See
FIScHR, supra note 109, § 307, at 717-18 (discussing "tort-reform" statutes).
135. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 110, at 530 (stating that many courts utilize
"reasonable relationship" test to reign in jury's wide discretion in granting punitive damages).
136. See Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 163 (stating that award of "punitive damages in a partic-
ular case is entirely within the discretion of the jury").
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subjective feelings about a defendant could influence the amount of the puni-
tive damages.
137
Many courts look to the amount of compensatory damages to determine
whether the punitive damages are reasonable to prevent imposition of exces-
sive punitive damages. 13 If the amount of punitive damages is "grossly exces-
sive" in relation to the damage the defendant actually caused, courts will
reduce the punitive damages. 139 The reasoning underlying such reductions is
that such a large amount of punitive damages exceeds both what is sufficient
punishment for the defendant's actions and what is necessary to deter future
action, thereby overstepping the purpose of punitive damages."4
11 Punitive Damages Under Gore
Furthermore, punitive damages have become increasingly controversial,
particularly as they pertain to due process considerations.141 As late as 1993,
the Supreme Court affirmed punitive damage awards far in excess of compen-
satory damages. 42 The Court's rationale for upholding such large damages
was that even though the amounts were out of proportion to the compensatory
damages, the punitive damages did not violate the defendants' due process
rights. 143 However, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,144 the Supreme
137. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 9 (1991) (stating that punitive damages
may not be upheld if they were "the product of bias or passion" on part of jury) (quoting
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989)); ERemplary
Damages, supra note 110, at 530 (stating that "exemplary damages are based on the jury's
feelings and sentiments as to what will best punish and deter the defendant").
138. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 110, at 530 (noting many courts' use of
"reasonable relationship" test to limit jury's discretion in granting punitive damages).
* 139. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (stating that "grossly
excessive" punitive damages violate due process); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509
U.S. 443,454 (1993) (same).
140. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 158 (Wis. 1997) (noting that
society is not interested in punishing and deterring conduct that creates little harm).
141. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 585-86 (reducing punitive damage award in light of due process
considerations). Gore initiated a new examination into punitive damages and the due process
considerations implicated by excessive punitive awards. See infra notes 144-61 and accompa-
nying text (articulating Supreme Court's rationale behind Gore).
142. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,466 (1993) (upholding
punitive award of $10 million with compensatory award of $19,000); Pacific Mut Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991) (upholding punitive award of more than four times amount
of compensatory award).
143. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 462 (finding extremely large punitive damage award within
power of state); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23-24 ,(finding adequate procedural protections and
objective criteria to support jury's award of punitive damages).
144. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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Court departed from this rationale and struck down a large punitive damage
award.
145
Gore involved an Alabama products liability claim, in which the plaintiff
sought compensatory damages for a repainted BMW and punitive damages on
the basis of the defendant dealer's misrepresentations about the car.1 46 The
jury awarded $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive
damages, which the Alabama Supreme Court then reduced to $2 million.
1 47
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court determined that the amount of
punitive damages violated the defendant's due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Three factors led to this conclusion.1 49 First, the
Court determined that the defendant's conduct was not sufficiently reprehensi-
ble and did not warrant such a large punitive damage award."0 Recognizing
that "some wrongs are more blameworthy than others," the Court reasoned
that the purely economic harm that the defendant caused was not sufficiently
reprehensible to warrant such a large punitive damage award in addition to
compensation.'
5
145. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996) (comparing imposition
of punitive damage award to imposing "severe criminal penalty"). The plaintiff purchased an
automobile from the defendant, who had failed to disclose paint damage on the car prior to the
sale. Id. at 563. The plaintiff sued to recover the amount he paid for the car minus the true value
of the automobile, plus punitive damages for the defendant's misrepresentation. Id. at 563-64.
The jury awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive
damages. Id. at 565. The Alabama Supreme Court found the $4 million punitive award exces-
sive and ordered remittur of $2 million. Id. at 567. After the defendant appealed, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of a punitive award 500 times the size
of the compensatory award. Id. at 568. The Court held that the punitive damages award violated
the constitutional limits of a permissible punitive award. Id. at 585-86. The Court considered
the degree of reprehensibility of defendant's conduct, the ratio of punitive damages to compensa-
tory damages, and the possible sanctions available under the comparable criminal statute to
determine that the punitive award in this case was unreasonable. Id. at 575-85.
146. See id. at 563 (discussing facts of case and amount requested in complaint).
147. See id. at 565-67 (detailing procedural history of case).
148. See id. at 585-86 (determining that excessiveness of punitive award exceeded consti-
tutional limits).
149. See id. at 574-75 (discussing three factors that Court considered in determining puni-
tive damage award to be excessive). The Court "rejccted the notion that the constitutional line
is marked by a simple mathematical formula." Id. at 582 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,458 (1993)).
150. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-80 (1996) (analyzing
reprehensibility of defendant's conduct). The Court noted that "[p]erhaps the most important
indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct" Id. at 575.
151. See id. at 576 (determining that defendant's conduct was not sufficiently reprehensible
to support punitive damage award). The Court stated that "none of the aggravating factors
associated with particularly reprehensible conduct [were] present." Id. The Court explained
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The second factor the Court considered was the ratio of the punitive
damages to compensatory damages. 52 The Court found that the $2 million
punitive damage award was "grossly excessive" compared to the $4,000 com-
pensatory award.153 The Court stated that punitive damages should reasonably
relate to the actual harm that has occurred, and to the "harm likely to result
from the defendant's conduct. 1" 4 In Gore, the Court noted that not only were
the punitive damages 500 times greater than the compensatory damages, but
also no threat of additional damage was ever present under the facts of the
case.
155
Lastly, the Court examined the sanctions available under Alabama state
law for comparable misconduct." 6 The Court reasoned that because the
purpose of punitive damages is to punish, looking to the state legislature to
determine what it would consider sufficient punishment for this offense would
clarify whether the punitive damages were reasonable. 57 Noting that the
maximum civil fine that the defendant would face from the state of Alabama
was only $2,000, the Court determined that a $2 million punishment was
that because the harm was purely economic in nature, the defendant in no way compromised the
safety of its consumers, and the plaintiff produced no evidence that the defendant deliberately
deceived anyone with regard to the damaged automobiles, or had any improper motive at all.
Id. at 576, 579.
152. See id. at 580-83 (analyzing reasonableness of punitive damages in relation to com-
pensatory damages, as well as actual damages).
153. See id. at 585-86 (finding punitive damages unreasonable as compared to amount of
compensatory award). The Court found that because the punitive damage award was more than
500 times greater than the amount of damage the plaintiff actually suffered, the punitive award
was excessive. Id. at 582-83. The Court maintained, however, that under certain circumstances,
punitive damages that are relatively large in comparison to the corresponding compensatory
damages would be acceptable. See id. at 582 (stating that "low awards of compensatory
damages may properly support a higher ratio... [if] a particularly egregious act has resulted
in only a small amount of economic damages").
154. Id. at 581 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460
(1993)).
155. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996) (stating that jury's
punitive award was 500 times the amount of compensatory damages); see id. at 582 (stating that
"there is no suggestion that Dr. Gore or any other BMW purchaser was threatened with any
additional potential harm").
156. See id. at 583-85 (comparing punitive damage award to civil fines defendant would
face in criminal proceeding).
157. See id. at 583 (noting importance of state's punishment policy in deciding whether
punitive damage award is reasonable). The Court stated that "a reviewing court engaged
in determining whether an award of punitive damages is excessive should 'accord substan-
tial deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at
issue.'" Id. (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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indeed excessive.' Furthermore, the Court maintained that because the civil
penalty was so low in comparison to the punitive damages, the defendant
could not have foreseen this large amount of punitive damages. 59 Subjecting
the defendant to this punitive damage award would, the Court reasoned,
violate the defendant's substantive due process rights."W This factor, together
with the lack of reprehensible conduct on the part of the defendant and the
excessive ratio ofthe punitive award to the plaintiff's actual damages, contrib-
uted to the Court's determination that the punitive damage award could not
stand under the Fourteenth Amendment.
61
VIIl. Common Law and Due Process Limitations Applied
to § 1981a Claims
Although courts traditionally have attached the aforementioned limita-
tions to punitive damages, they are unnecessary under § 1981a because of
Congress's implementation of caps to damage awards.' 62 These caps, which
apply to the combined total of punitive and compensatory damages, create
their own limitations on the availability of punitive damages under § 198 la. 63
As this Note will demonstrate, the effect of these limitations obviate the need
for the restrictions that courts commonly have placed on punitive damages .64
A. Actual Damages and Reasonable Ratio
Although the common law requires that a plaintiff prove actual damage
before recovering punitive damages, this limitation on punitive damages
should not apply in the case of recovery under § 198 la.' 61 The common law
158. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 584 (noting that maximum penalty for defendant's conduct
under Alabama's Deceptive Trade Practices Act was civil fine not to exceed $2,000).
159. See id. (acknowledging that civil fine would not "provide an out-of-state distributor
with fair notice that the . . .[violation] might subject an offender to a multimillion dollar
penalty").
160. See id. at 585 (maintaining that subjecting defendant to punitive award would be
"tantamount to a severe criminal penalty').
161. Id. at 575-85. But see Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 165 (Wis.
1997) (discussing Gore's limited application to trespass cases involving reprehensible conduct
but no actual injury).
162. See infra notes 163-92 and accompanying text (explaining how total damages caps
dispense with need for limitations on punitive damages).
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3) (1994) (setting maximum amount limitations on total
damages available under § 1981 a).
164. See infra notes 165-92 and accompanying text (articulating how limitations on
punitive damages are inappropriate and unnecessary under the statutory scheme of§ .1981a).
165. See infra notes 166-70 (discussing inapplicability of actual damages requirement for
§ 1981a claims).
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conceptions that punitive damages should only accompany actual damages
and should bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages are
inapplicable to sex discrimination claims under § 198 la." The damages caps
limit the total amount of damages; thus, the compensatory and punitive
damages together cannot exceed a certain set amount.167 As such, the higher
a plaintiff's compensatory damages are, the lower her punitive damages must
be.'" If a plaintiff were required to prove actual damages to recover punitive
damages under § 198 Ia, the effect would be that as the plaintiff suffers greater
harm, the defendant would face less punishment. 69 More plausible is the idea
that Congress, with its primary goal of furthering compensation for sex
discrimination claims, intended that punitive damages should act as a substi-
tute for compensatory damages in cases in which the defendant had behaved
outrageously and caused significant emotional harm to the plaintiff, but
which, because of the intangible nature of the harm, the plaintiff may have
trouble proving.1
70
Furthermore, by limiting the total amount of damages in this manner, the
caps create an inverse relationship between the compensatory and punitive
damages. 1' This inverse relationship impedes the usefulness of the reason-
able relationship test. 72 For this reason, the principle that a reasonable ratio
must exist between compensatory and punitive damages cannot apply to
§ 1981a claims.'" The caps also address the concern that a jury may grant
166. See infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text (addressing inapplicability of "reason-
able relationship" test to punitive and compensatory damages under § 1981 a).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3) (1994).
168. See id. (setting limitations on maximum amount of punitive and compensatory
damages combined).
169. See id. (stating explicitly that caps apply to both punitive and compensatory damages
under § 1981a).
170. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(l),at25 (1991),reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 694,718
(noting goal of 1991 Civil Rights Act to compensate victims of discrimination who suffer
emotional (intangible) harm and economic consequences thereof); H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (1), at
18 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 549, 556 (explaining that purpose of Civil Rights
Act of 1991 was in part "to strengthen existing remedies to provide more effective deterrence
and ensure compensation commensurate with the harms suffered by victims of intentional
discrimination"); id. at 65 (recognizing need for damages to "make discrimination victims whole
for the terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional health, and to their self-
respect and dignity").
171. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3) (1994) (requiring "the sum of the amount" of compensa-
tory and punitive damages not to exceed caps (emphasis added)).
172. Id.
173. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 110, at 531 (articulating principle that "reason-
able relationship" test is useful for "controlling grossly excessive verdicts"). Because the dam-
ages caps prevent "grossly excessive" damages, thereby creating an inverse relationship between
the compensatory and punitive damages, the "reasonable relationship" test is an ineffective
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excessive damages.' In establishing these damage caps, Congress deter-
mined what constitutes a reasonable amount of damages that an employer
should pay. " ' Therefore, Congress has significantly limited a jury's discre-
tion over the amount of damages a plaintiff may receive."" These caps
eliminate the need for the procedural safeguard of examining the ratio be-
tween compensatory and punitive damages to determine the reasonableness
of the punitive damages. "'
B. Gore Factors
Punitive damages under § 198 la also satisfy the reasonableness require-
ment under the two remaining Gore factors: reprehensibility of the defen-
dant's conduct and comparable criminal sanctions.17 The legislative history
measuring tool for determining the reasonableness of punitive damages. See supra notes 167-69
and accompanying text (discussing impact of damages caps on relationship between compensa-
tory and punitive damages).
174. See H.R. REP. 102-40(l),at72-73 (1991),reprintedin 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 549,610-
11 (explaining congressional concern over "disproportional jury awards" under Title VII's new
remedial scheme). The House Report articulated the concern that members of Congress felt
over the potential for excessive damages. Id. The Report articulated procedural safeguards such
as the tiered burdens a plaintiff would have to overcome to recover under § 1981a. Id.
("Plaintiffs must first prove intentional discrimination, then must prove actual injury or loss
arising therefrom to recover compensatory damages, and must meet an even higher standard...
to recover punitive damages.") (emphasis omitted). The damages caps in § 1981a likely were
incorporated into the Act to mitigate these fears. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3) (1994) (establish-
ing damages caps).
175. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bX3) (1994) (explaining structure of damages caps). Congress
established tiers of damages caps, with each level corresponding to the size of an employer. Id.
For example, employers with "more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees" shall not pay more
than $50,000, whereas employers with "more than 500 employees" shall not pay more than
$300,000 (the maximum cap). Id. Congress's consideration of the employer's size in determin-
ing damages amounts indicate that Congress believed these damages amounts were reasonable
to achieve Congress's goals for § 198 1a of compensation, punishment, and deterrence. See
FISCHER, supra note 109, § 303, at 704 (stating that courts will use evidence of defendant's
wealth "to determine 'whether the amount of damages exceeds the level necessary to properly
punish and deter'" (quoting Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Cal. 1991))).
176. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text (articulating idea that Congress
intended damages caps to restrain jury verdicts).
177. See Exemplary Damages, supra note 110, at 530 (recognizing that purpose for
requiring "reasonable relationship" between compensatory and punitive damages stems from
courts' desire to "limit the jury's wide discretion").
178. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing reprehensibility of sex
discrimination); infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (discussing lack of criminal sanc-
tions for workplace sex discrimination and Congress's intent for § 1981a to fulfill that function).
For a discussion of the third Gore factor, the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages,
see supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text (analyzing § 1981a under "reasonable relation-
ship" test).
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of § 1981a indicates that Congress considered sex discrimination in the
workplace to be reprehensible conduct.'79 Congress's interest in eliminating
sex discrimination was a primary reason for enacting § 198 la.' By making
sex discrimination more cost prohibitive, Congress hoped to eliminate cases
of workplace sex discrimination."" Providing plaintiffs with access to dam-
ages ensured that employers would be less likely to engage in discriminatory
conduct.
8 2
Congress also intended for the implementation of damages under § 198 la
to provide an incentive for employees to bring suit.83 The remedies available
to victims of sex discrimination under Title VII before the 1991 Civil Rights
Act were so inadequate that a victim often had little incentive to bring suit.
8 4
By providing damages, Congress hoped that the added incentive to bring suit
would encourage plaintiffs to act as "private attorneys general" in punishing
and deterring offenders."8" Having plaintiffs act in this capacity, Congress
intended that the imposition of damages under § 1981a would serve the same
function as a criminal sanction.'86
The Gore Court determined that unreasonable punitive damages would
violate due process. 7 The damage caps in § 198 Ia create an inverse relation-
ship between punitive and compensatory damages, making the ratio test an
ineffective measuring tool for determining the reasonableness of punitive
damages.' Congress has determined, however, that sex discrimination is
179. See H.R. REP. 102-40 (1), at 66-69 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,604-
07 (chronicling stories of sex discrimination).
180. See id. at 65 (reasoning that "[m]onetary damages simply raise the cost of an em-
ployer's engaging in intentional discrimination, thereby providing employers with additional




183. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (), at 25 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 694,718
(recognizing "little incentive for plaintiff to bring a Title VII suit" prior to Congress's imple-
mentation of damages under § 198 Ia).
184. Id.
185. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (1), at 65(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 549,603
(stating that damages are "necessary to encourage citizens to act as private attorneys general to
enforce the statute").
186. SeeH.R.REP.No. 102-40 (I), at 27 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,721
(recognizing that without damages, employers who intentionally discriminate are able "to avoid
any meaningful liability").
187. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517, U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (noting that "grossly
excessive" punitive damages violate due process).
188. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text (discussing "reasonable relationship"
test between compensatory and punitive damages).
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reprehensible conduct and that permitting recovery of punitive damages, with
caps to prevent excessive total damages, will sufficiently punish offenders. ' 9
Furthermore, Congress intended this civil punishment in lieu of criminal
sanctions."s These underlying considerations establish that punitive damages
under § 198 la are reasonable. 9' These considerations would be present even
in the absence of compensatory damages under § 198 1a; therefore, a grant of
punitive damages without compensatory damages would also be reasonable) 92
1. Further Justification: Measuring Punitive Damages
Under Kolstad
The standard for awarding punitive damages favors allowing punitive
damages without compensatory damages. 93 However, courts need some
objective indication of that mental state - such as the amount of harm the
defendant has caused the plaintiff to suffer - in order to properly assess the
amount of punitive damages the defendant should pay."9 A potential prob-
189. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's perception of
sex discrimination).
190. See supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text (discussing function of damages under
§ 1981a as substitute for criminal sanctions for sex discrimination).
191. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154,164-65 (Wis. 1997) (utilizing
three Gore factors to determine whether $100,000 punitive damages for trespass violate due
process).
192. Cf id. at 165-66 (finding punitive damages to be reasonable after application of Gore
factors despite absence of compensatory damages). The Jacque court analyzed the $100,000
punitive damages that the jury granted on a trespass claim to determine reasonableness after
determining that the damages could stand without compensatory damages. Id. Although the
punitive damages did not satisfy two of the three Gore factors, the court determined that the
punitive damages were nonetheless reasonable. Id. at 165. The court determined that the
defendant's conduct was reprehensible despite the fact that defendant caused no pecuniary
harm. Id. at 164. According to the court, the defendant's conduct exhibited "an indifference
and a reckless disregard for the law, and for the rights of others," which the court deemed
reprehensible. Id. The court, however, rejected the ratio and comparable criminal sanctions
factors. Id. The court reasoned that the ratio test would prevent recovery of punitive damages
in "situations where egregious acts result in injuries that are hard to detect or noneconomic harm
that is difficult to measure." Id. at 164-65. The court stated that comparing the punitive
damages to available criminal sanctions was also ineffective because often, as in this case, the
available criminal sanction is insufficient to properly deter socially unacceptable behavior. Id.
at 165. The court, therefore, determined that the circumstances of this case nullified the last two
Gore factors and held the punitive damages to be reasonable. Id.
193. See infra notes 213-15 and accompanying text (arguing that Kolstad standard of
punitive liability creates regime in which punitive damages may exist without compensatory
damages).
194. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.11(2), at 470 (stating that state-of-mind references used
to award punitive damages are subjective and that often courts require objective manifestation
of this state of mind, such as bad conduct, to award punitive damages).
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len, then, arises when a defendant acts with the requisite malicious motive,
yet the conduct does not appear to be sufficiently reprehensible to warrant
punitive damages.
1 95
Fortunately, in gauging a defendant's conduct, courts generally assess the
defendant's mental state."9 The Supreme Court solidified this rule with
regard to § 1981a in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n." Congress had
established the requirement that the employer engage "in a discriminatory
practice ... with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally pro-
tected rights of an aggrieved individual" as the standard for recovering puni-
tive damages.'" This standard brings the factor of a plaintiff's "federally
protected rights" into the mix, along with mental state and conduct, in deter-
mining appropriate punitive damage awards.1 Some federal circuit courts
had determined that if an employer discriminated against an employee with
malicious intent, the employee could recover punitive damages against the
employer.' e Other circuit courts maintained that punitive damages were
unavailable unless the plaintiff proved that the employer's conduct was
egregious, regardless of the employer's mental state."'
The Supreme Court recognized that circuits had been divided over what
standard to use in assessing whether punitive damages were recoverable in
§ 1981a suits.202 Looking to the language of § 198 la, the Court determined
that the two-tiered standard of culpability in § 1981a demonstrated Congress's
intent that the availability of punitive damages be based on the defendant's
195. See id. § 3.11(2), at 468 (stating that "[p]unitive damages are awarded when the
defendant is guilty of both a bad state of mind and highly serious misconduct" (emphasis
added)).
196. See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 103, at 651 (noting that "[tihe defendant's state of
mind is what transforms conduct from the understandable to the intolerable").
197. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(bXl) (1994).
199. See id. (granting punitive damages for defendants' "reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual"); Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S.
526, 534 (1999) (noting that Congress's inclusion of employer's mental state with regard to
employee's federally protected right institutes two-tiered liability structure).
200. See Amy L. Blaisdell, Note, A New Standard ofEmployer Liability Emerges Kolstad
v. American Dental Ass'n Addresses Vicarious Liability in Punitive Damages, 44 ST. LOUIS
L.J. 1561, 1575 (2000) (noting some courts required mental state of "something more than...
intentional discrimination" (internal quotes omitted)). Blaisdell acknowledged the difficulties
that circuit courts experienced in attempting to define what burden employees had to satisfy to
recover punitive damages. Id.
201. See id. (stating that many courts required that plaintiff demonstrate defendant's
outrageous conduct to recover punitive damages).
202. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 533 (1999) (explaining that Court
granted certiorari to "resolve a conflict among the Federal Courts of Appeals concerning the
circumstances under which ajury may consider a request for punitive damages").
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mental state regarding the defendant's discriminatory actions. °3 Specifically,
Congress intended to provide punitive damages in situations in which an
employer either acted maliciously or with evil motive, or acted "in the face of
a perceived risk that" the employer's conduct would violate the federally
protected rights of the employee.20 The Court noted clearly that the reckless
disregard requirement applies to the employer's perception of the employee's
federally protected rights and not to the employer's actual conduct. 2 ' Thus,
while an employer may harass an employee without any malice or evil intent
toward the employee, if the employer nonetheless engages in conduct that he
knows or should know would violate the federally protected rights of the
employee, the employer can be liable for punitive damages.2'c
Furthermore, the Court determined that recovery of punitive damages
under § 198 1a does not require that a plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant
203. See id. at 534 (noting Congress's intent "to impose two standards of liability"). The
Court recognized that a plaintiff may recover damages under § 1981a only for intentional
discrimination. Id. The Court also noted that § 1981a requires proof that the defendant acted
with malice or reckless disregard in addition to proof of intentional discrimination for a plaintiff
to recover punitive damages. Id. The Court determined, therefore, that Congress intended for
plaintiffs to recover punitive damages only upon a showing of greater culpability from the
defendant than merely intentional discrimination. Id.
204. See id. at 536 (articulating Court's standard for awarding punitive damages under
§ 1981a).
205. See id. at 535 (stating that "[tihe terms 'malice' or 'reckless indifference' pertain to
the employer's knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that
it is engaging in discrimination").
206. See id. at 536 (recognizing that Congress intended to subject employers to puni-
tive damages who at minimum acted in "face of a perceived risk" that actions would violate
employee's federally protected right to be free from discrimination). The Court also noted
several examples of conduct that would constitute discrimination, but would nonetheless
not subject an employer to a punitive damage award. Id. at 536-37. The Court stated the fol-
lowing:
There will be' circumstances where intentional discrimination does not give rise to
punitive damages liability under this standard. In some instances, the employer
may simply be unaware of the relevant federal prohibition. There will be cases,
moreover, in which the employer discriminates with the distinct belief that its dis-
crimination is lawful. The underlying theory of discrimination may be novel or
otherwise poorly recognized, or an employer may reasonably believe that its dis-
crimination satisfies a bona fide occupational qualification defense or other statu-
tory exception to liability.
Id.
While an employer may not know that his actions are discriminatory, an employer that
engages in sex discrimination, such as creating a hostile work environment, cannot escape
liability from punitive damages by invoking the theory that the creation of a hostile work
environment is a novel form of discrimination. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (recognizing employer's fostering of hostile work environment to constitute
sex discrimination under Title VI).
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ekhibited particularly outrageous conduct. The Court recognized that under
the common law, punitive damages usually accompany a defendant's outra-
geous conduct.20 The Court mantained, however, that the reason for this
tradition lay in the idea that punitive damages really punish the motive or
mental state behind the outrageous behavior. 209 While outrageous conduct
often accompanies an improper motive, the Court reasoned that to properly
punish the evil motive, a court cannot rely simply on whether the defendant's
conduct was egregious.21° Rather, the nature of an employer's conduct may
be a measuring tool to help a jury determine the motive of the defendant.
211
The Court emphasized, however, that a plaintiff does not need to prove that
the employer "engage[d] in conduct with some independent, 'egregious'
quality before being subject to [punitive damages]."
212
According to the Supreme Court, Congress intended that the purpose of
punitive damages under § 1981a is to punish the mental state and not the
nature ofthe conduct itself.213 The fact that an employee may recover punitive
damages without proving outrageous conduct from the defendant and only
proving that the defendant acted with reckless disregard to the employee's
rights further supports the notion that punitive damages are recoverable in the
absence of a compensatory award.214 Under the rule that the Court articulated
207. See Kolstad v. Am. DentalAss'n, 527 U.S. 526,535 (1999) (noting that § 1981a does
not require that plaintiff demonstrate egregious conduct on part of defendant "independent of
the employer's state of mind").
208. See id. at 537 (acknowledging tradition of including both mental state and egregious
conduct as prerequisites to awarding punitive damages).
209. See id. at 538 (noting that "[m]ost often ... eligibility for punitive awards is charac-
terized in terms of a defendant's motive or intent").
210. See id. (articulating principle that egregious conduct is subject to punishment because
of underlying mental state (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2), at 464-65
(1979))).
211. See id. at 539 (maintaining usefulness of showing egregious conduct on part of
defendant to prove defendant's mental state).
212. Id. at 538.
213. See id. at 535 (explaining Congress's intent that courts base employer's liability for
punitive damages on employer's mental state, rather than on actual conduct). The Court
explained that the dichotomy between an employer's mental state and the actions he has
committed is best exemplified through the remedies available under Title VII prior to the
enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the compensatory and punitive damages available
after the Act's enactment Id. at 534-35. The Court emphasized that the damages under the
1991 Act are not recoverable at all unless the employer has engaged in intentional discrimina-
tion. Id. at 535. This contrasts with the Title VII rule for equitable remedies, under which any
discrimination, including disparate impact discrimination, will create liability for equitable
remedies on the part of the employer. See id. (noting that employees may only recover compen-
satory and punitive damages under § 1981a for intentional discrimination).
214. See id. at 536 (noting that employer need only engage in conduct sufficient to
constitute "subjective consciousness of a risk of injury or illegality" (quoting Smith v. Wade,
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in Kolstad, as long as the employer acted without regard to the rights of the
employee to be free from such action under federal employment discrimina-
tion statutes, the employer would still be liable for punitive damages.
213
X Conclusion
Congress intended through § 1981 a to provide a means to fully compen-
sate victims of sex discrimination and to punish their offenders.216 Congress
also expressed a strong policy interest in preventing sex discrimination in the
workplace and voiced the intention to deter employers from engaging in sex
461 U.S. 30,37, n.6 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted))). The Court recognized that any
act an employer commits with reckless disregard to an employee's federally protected rights
constitutes egregious conduct. See id. at 538 (stating that "[c]onduct warranting punitive
awards has been characterized as 'egregious' . . . because of the defendant's mental state"
(emphasis added)). The Court's insistence that a trial court does not need to find that the
employer's conduct is outrageous apart from the employer's mental state permits the inference
that an employer may act with conscious disregard to an employee's rights, without the em-
ployer's conduct actually being demonstrably outrageous. See id. (maintaining that employer's
conduct need not be independently egregious for the employer to be liable for punitive dam-
ages).
Often, in employment discrimination situations, the nature of the employment relationship
is what makes the conduct outrageous. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.11(2), at 474-75 (noting
"abuse of power" in employment discrimination as circumstance that would amplify otherwise
non-egregious conduct to conduct considered to be outrageous); see also Timm v. Progressive
Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998) (upholding punitive damage award
despite jury's failure to award compensatory damages). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned that plaintiff's prior occupation as a prison guard could have accounted for the jury's
failure to award compensatory damages. Id. at 1010. Nonetheless, the court considered defend-
ant's indifference to plaintiff's plight - that she suffered unwanted touches and advances from
her supervisor - to be sufficiently egregious in light of the employment relationship. Id. at
1009.
215. See supra note 214 (discussing "reckless indifference" rule under Kolstad and Seventh
Circuit's treatment of employer's reckless indifference and punitive damages in Timm). The
Kolstad Court also addressed the standard for vicarious punitive liability in circumstances in
which the plaintiff seeks to impute the punitive liability to the employer for the acts of another
employee. See Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 539 (addressing vicarious liability for punitive damages).
The Court determined that an employer may be vicariously liable for punitive damages if the
harassing employee is "serving in a 'managerial capacity' [and] committed the wrong while
'acting in the scope of employment.'" Id. at 543. The Court maintained, however, that an
employer's "good faith efforts to comply with Title VII" will prevent the employer's liability
for punitive damages. Id. at 544-45. Nevertheless, if a managerial employee sexually harasses
another employee and has the requisite mental state to sustain punitive damages, the employer
will be liable for the punitive damages unless the employer has taken some action to prevent
or curb the discrimination in the workplace. See id. at 546 (discussing factors for consideration
in assessing defendant employer's punitive liability).
216. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (1), at 64-65 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 549,
602-03 (expressing Congress's intent to fully compensate victims of intentional discrimination,
deter future intentional discrimination, and encourage enforcement of sex discrimination laws).
674
COMPENSATORYAND PUNITIVE DAMAGES UNDER § 1981a 675
discrimination through § 198 la's remedial scheme.217 The legislative history
of § 1981a demonstrates Congress's intent to provide punitive damages to
punish and deter sex discrimination.2"8 Furthermore, Congress expressed that
the availability of full compensation to victims for both their economic in-
juries and their intangible emotional harm was a primary goal of the amend-
ments.
219
Section 1981a does not mirror § 1983 in either its policy or its structure;
therefore, the rationale for allowing punitive damages under § 1983 cannot
apply to § 198 la. Nevertheless, permitting punitive damages without proof of
actual damage under § 1981 a is entirely reasonable.22 Congress's implementa-
tion of damages caps create inconsistencies between the limitations that courts
usually place on punitive damages and the actual ability to recover punitive
damages under § 198 1a. 1 Punitive damages also pass the reasonableness tests
that the Gore Court established.'m Congress's intent to establish punitive
damages under § 1981a demonstrates that a jury's grant of punitive damages
would be reasonable under Gore even without compensatory damages.'
Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded in Kolstad that a defendant's
mental state is the decisive factor in determining whether punitive damages
are appropriate for sex discrimination under § 198 Ia.224 The Court deter-
mined that an employer who discriminates "in the face of a perceived risk"
that the employer's actions might violate the federally protected rights of an
employee may be liable for punitive damages."2 The Court also maintained
217. Id. (emphasis added).
218. See supra Part l (discussing legislative history of 1991 Civil Rights Act).
219. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40 (1), at 18(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CA.N. 549,556
(explaining purpose of Civil Rights Act of 1991 was in part "to strengthen existing remedies to
provide more effective deterrence and ensure compensation commensurate with the harms
suffered by victims of intentional discrimination"); id. at 65 (recognizing need for damages to
"make discrimination victims whole for the terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and
emotional health, and to their self-respect and dignity").
220. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text (discussing how proving damage is
unnecessary to recover punitive damages under § 1981a).
221. See supra notes 165-77 and accompanying text (explaining how combined caps on
punitive and compensatory damages create inverse relationship between compensatory and
punitive damages).
222. See supra Part VII.B (analyzing reasonableness of punitive damages under Gore
factors).
223. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing Jacque court's decision to
uphold punitive damages despite lack of compensatory damages).
224. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999) (determining that
employer's mental state establishes basis for punitive liability rather than employer's actual
conduct); see also supra Part IX (discussing KoLstad Court's analysis of punitive liability for
sex discrimination claims).
225. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536.
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that a plaintiff need not demonstrate outrageous conduct apart from the defen-
dant's mental state to establish liability for punitive damages.226 Under the
Kolstad ruling, therefore, an employer may engage in subtle discrimination
with disregard to an employee's rights, yet still be liable for punitive
damages. 7 If, in such a situation, a plaintiff suffers no injury or is unable to
prove injury from the defendant's conduct, the plaintiff should still be able to
recover punitive damages if the employer had the requisite mental state while
engaging in discrimination against the employee.2'
Difficulty can arise in quantifying damages from a sex discrimination
claim; therefore, an award of punitive damages without compensatory dam-
ages in these situations is a real possibility. 9 To avoid undermining Con-
gress's desire to punish and deter sex discrimination in the workplace, puni-
tive damages in these claims cannot depend on whether a plaintiff recovers
compensatory damages.3 Punitive damages, therefore, should be permissible
in the absence of compensatory damages under § 1981a.2"
226. Id. at 539.
227. See id. at 538-39 (establishing that mental state is determining factor in establishing
employer's liability for punitive damages); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581
(1996) (requiring consideration of harm defendant actually caused as well as "the harm likely
to result from the defendant's conduct" in determining punitive liability).
228. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 (recognizing that in some cases, low compensatory
damages may support high punitive damages). The Gore Court, in discussing the relationship
between compensatory damages and punitive damages, stated:
Indeed, low awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio
than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has
resulted in only a small amount of economic damages. A higher ratio may also be
justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of
noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine. It is appropriate,
therefore, to reiterate our rejection of a categorical approach.
Id.
229. See, e.g., Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc., 137 F.3d 1008, 1009 (7th Cir.
1998) (addressing situation in which jury granted punitive damages without compensatory
damages); Cush-Crawford v. Adchem Corp., 94 F. Supp. 2d 294,299 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (same).
230. See Cush-Crawford, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (noting that "[n]othing in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)... can be read to imply a requirement that a punitive damage award be accompa-
nied by an award of compensatory damages"), see also supra Part MI (describing Congress's
goals in enacting § 1981a).
231. See supra notes 216-31 and accompanying text (concluding that victims of sex dis-
crimination do not need to prove compensatory damages to recover punitive damages under
§ 1981a).
